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a b s t r a c t
This study investigated time, numerosity and space processing in a patient (CB) with a right hemisphere
lesion. We tested whether these magnitude dimensions share a common magnitude system or whether
they are processed by dimension-speciﬁc magnitude systems. Five experimental tasks were used: Tasks
1–3 assessed time and numerosity independently and time and numerosity jointly. Tasks 4 and 5 inves-
tigated space processing independently and space and numbers jointly. Patient CB was impaired at
estimating time and at discriminating between temporal intervals, his errors being underestimations.
In contrast, his ability to process numbers and space was normal. A unidirectional interaction between
numbers and time was found in both the patient and the control subjects. Strikingly, small numbers were
perceived as lasting shorter and large numbers as lasting longer. In contrast, number processing was not
affected by time, i.e. short durations did not result in perceiving fewer numbers and long durations in
perceiving more numbers. Numbers and space also interacted, with small numbers answered faster when
presented on the left side of space, and the reverse for large numbers. Our results demonstrate that time
processing can be selectively impaired. This suggests that mechanisms speciﬁc for time processing may
be partially independent from those involved in processing numbers and space. However, the interaction
between numbers and time and between numbers and space also suggests that although independent,
there maybe some overlap between time, numbers and space. These data suggest a partly shared mech-
anism between time, numbers and space which may be involved in magnitude processing or may be
itiverecruited to perform cogn
. Introduction
The issue of whether the human brain processes various types of
agnitude through a shared mechanism or whether we have dif-
erent magnitude representations for each magnitude dimension
as been the focus of recent behavioural, animal and neuroimag-
ng research. Neuropsychological evidence so far has been rather
carce.
.1. One common magnitude system
It has been suggested that a single fully shared representational
echanism may underpin time and numerosity processing (Meck
Church, 1983). Based on evidence coming from animal stud-es, this single mechanism has been hypothesized as an ‘internal
ccumulator’ which represents the duration or the numerosity of
vents/objects (Boysen & Capaldi, 1993; Breukelaar & Dalrymple-
lford, 1998; Meck & Church, 1983; Roberts & Church, 1978).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 7679 5430; fax: +44 20 7813 2835.
E-mail address: m.cappelletti@ucl.ac.uk (M. Cappelletti).
028-3932/© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.05.024operations on magnitude dimensions.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
The internal accumulator is thought to sum up the impulses pro-
duced by a generator. For time perception this generator produces
impulses each time an event is encountered, for numerosity each
time an object is encountered (Meck & Church, 1983). Meck and
Church (1983) also suggested that the accumulator can only receive
information either about time or numerosity at one given time.
Some authors have adopted a more radical interpretation of Meck
and Church’s view, and have suggested that time and numbers
are also represented in the same format as continuous quantities
(Gallistel & Gelman, 2004). From this perspective, two predictions
can be made. First, no neuropsychological dissociations should be
expected between time and numbers as impairments to the accu-
mulator should equally affect both dimensions. Second, no interac-
tions between these dimensions should be expected, as the accu-
mulator is assumed to process time and numerosity one at a time.
The idea of a single representational mechanism supporting
magnitude processing has been recently extended within a new
theory termed ATOM (A Theory Of Magnitude, Walsh, 2003).
According to this theoretical framework a single representational
mechanism underpins time, quantity and also space. The ATOM
proposes that these magnitude dimensions share an innate, com-
mon metric system for action which operates on a shared internal
M. Cappelletti et al. / Neuropsychologia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2733
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nig. 1. (A) Patient CBs brain scan in the axial plane (left) in relation to a template (r
nd coronal (bottom left) views in relation to a template (right).
ccumulator. Moreover, the common magnitude system is only
artly shared among magnitude dimensions as each of them is
lso implemented by dimension-speciﬁc processes (Walsh, 2003,
ig. 1b). The ATOM differs from previous accounts as it includes
space’ as an additional magnitude dimension, it assumes a partly
nd not fully shared accumulator mechanism, and it hypothesises
hat this common magnitude system is located in the right parietal
obe. However, at present the ATOM is underspeciﬁed and makes no
lear predictions about the relation between the different magni-
ude dimensions and about the type of cognitive mechanisms and
eural correlates which are shared or distinct for each magnitude
imensions.
.2. Multiple magnitude systems
An alternative to the hypothesis of common magnitude system is
hat magnitude dimensions are distinct and that there are multiple
agnitude-speciﬁc systems. Although not systematically formu-
ated, this possibility is mentioned by some authors (e.g. Moyer &
andauer, 1967; Walsh, 2003). This hypothesis predicts that mag-
itude information is analysed separately for time, numbers and
pace and compared according to metrics unique to each compari-
on. It has been suggested that indirect support to this hypothesis
ay come from some imaging studies reporting greater activation
or numbers or for countable stimuli compared to other continu-
us magnitude dimensions such as luminosity or size (e.g. Castelli,
laser, & Butterworth, 2006; Fias, Fize, Georgieva, & Lammertyn,
003; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; but see Cohen
adosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008). Yet, greater brain activations
or numbers would not necessarily correspond to distinct cog-
itive processes involved in time, number and space processing.(B) The patient’s intraparietal sulcus indicated by red arrows in the axial (top left)
For instance, some authors have suggested that higher activation
for numbers may be due to more cognitive resources needed for
numerical compared to analogue processing of physical size (e.g.
Zorzi & Butterworth, 1999). Other authors, however, have suggested
that there is a shared neuronal substrate for numbers and space,
but not for other types of magnitude that are non-spatial (Pinel et
al., 2004). Two predictions follow from the hypothesis of a distinct
magnitude dimensions. First, dissociations between magnitude
dimensions are possible as they are thought to be independent. Sec-
ond, no interactions should occur between magnitude dimensions
as the magnitude information is processed independently.
A variant of this proposal would suggest that magnitude dimen-
sions can be distinct although they share the same operational
mechanisms, for instance comparison mechanisms (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2008). Support to this hypothesis comes from studies that
looked at whether processing numbers and other magnitude
dimensions activate same or different responses. These stud-
ies hypothesized that if operational mechanisms such as those
involved in comparison are shared between different magnitude
dimensions, then interactions between dimensions are expected. A
recent study combining fMRI and ERP showed that numbers and
physical size modulated activity in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS),
suggesting that their magnitude was processed through a com-
mon mechanism (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007). In addition, these
dimensions also interacted in the primary motor cortex, which was
interpreted as evidence that numerical and size value were pro-
cessed separately until response-related stages (Cohen Kadosh et
al., 2007). At present it is unclear whether time, number and space
processing are distinct but share operational mechanisms. Should
this be the case, it is possible to predict that dissociations between
dimensions may occur as well as interactions between them.
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.3. Interactions between magnitude dimensions
One way to test whether there are one or more magnitude
ystems is by looking for possible interactions between magni-
ude dimensions. The prediction is that no interactions should
ccur if these dimensions are thought to be independent from each
ther and implemented by independent magnitude systems. More-
ver, no interactions should occur on the basis of a fully shared
agnitude system where information about various magnitude
imensions can only be processed for one dimension at a time. On
he other hand, both the hypotheses of a partly shared mechanism
etween these dimensions or of shared operational mechanisms
llow us to expect interactions between them. These interactions
an be symmetric or bidirectional if two dimensions interfere with
r facilitate each other, such that, for example, processing time
s inﬂuenced by numerosity and processing numerosity is inﬂu-
nced by time. Interaction between magnitude dimensions can also
e unidirectional such that, for example, only numerosity would
nﬂuence time or vice versa. It has also been suggested that the
symmetric interference or facilitation of a dimension over another
ay indicate that this dimension is more salient or that it is pro-
essed faster or more efﬁciently (e.g. Dormal, Seron, & Pesenti,
006).
Behavioural studies exploring interactions between time and
umerosity have so far reported unidirectional interactions between
hese dimensions, with time processing more often affected by
umerosity processing (e.g. Dormal et al., 2006; Dormal, Andres, &
esenti, 2008; Droit-Volet, 2003). For instance, many studies have
hown that when subjects perform a numerical task or judge the
umerosity of non-symbolic quantity stimuli such as dots, tempo-
al intervals are perceived as shorter than their veridical duration
e.g. Burnside, 1971; Dormal et al., 2006, 2008; Droit-Volet, 2003;
ulliksen, 1927; Hawkes & Sherman, 1972; Xuan, Zhang, He, &
hen, 2007). These unilateral interactions of numbers over time
ave sometimes been explained in terms of their automatic access,
amely numbers would modulate performance even when irrele-
ant for the task (e.g. Dormal et al., 2006). So far, only one study has
eported an effect in the opposite direction, whereby time process-
ng interfered with efﬁcient mental arithmetic. This interference
f arithmetic on time perception has been interpreted as involving
ore generalized dual-task effects (Brown, 1997).
Evidence for bidirectional interaction between space and num-
ers comes from studies showing that space affects number
rocessing (i.e. SNARC effect, spatial numerical association of
esponse codes, Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993) as well as that
umbers can inﬂuence performance on spatial cognitive tasks (e.g.
onato, Priftis, Marenzi, & Zorzi, 2008, Calabria & Rossetti, 2005; de
evia, Girelli, & Vallar, 2006; Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003;
ubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2005;
toianov, Kramer, Umiltà, & Zorzi, 2007).
.4. The anatomical basis of time, numbers and space
Neuroimaging studies have mainly explored time, numbers
nd space independently and have consistently reported activa-
ions of the parietal regions among others (e.g. for time: Ivry,
996; Lejeune, El Ahmadi, & Weyers, 1997; Maquet et al., 1996;
ao, Mayer, & Harrington, 2001; Schubotz, Friederici, & Yves von
ramon, 2000; for numbers: Cappelletti, Lee, Freeman, & Price,
n press; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Pesenti, Thioux,
eron, & De Volder, 2000; Pinel et al., 2004; for space: Medendorp,
oltz, Vilis, & Crawford, 2003; Merriam, Genovese, & Colby, 2003).
oreover, some studies investigating time and numbers together
ave shown that the activation in the right inferior parietal lobe
Talairach co-ordinates 44 −52 40, Pouthas et al., 2000) cancelled
ut when the two conditions were subtracted from each other,logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
thus providing indirect evidence that these dimensions may rely
on similar brain areas (e.g. Maquet et al., 1996; Pouthas et al.,
2000).
This evidence would be consistent with the ATOMs proposal
that a precise neurological basis for the common magnitude system
is located in the right parietal regions (Walsh, 2003). Neverthe-
less, the ﬁndings that time, numbers and space independently
engage the parietal areas cannot be taken as conclusive evidence
that they share a common magnitude system because a com-
mon brain region may underpin different cognitive mechanisms. In
addition, the parietal lobes have been shown to be recruited in sev-
eral conceptual, perceptual and perceptual-motor transformations
such as response-selection processes which may be in common to
time, number, and space processing (e.g. Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon,
Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Culham &
Kanwisher, 2001; Richter et al., 2000; Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999).
That is, extracting and comparing learnt information from stim-
uli or selecting a response such as a left or right key press might
engage the same parietal areas irrespective of the cognitive task
performed. Therefore similar parietal activations during temporal,
numerical and spatial tasks may not necessarily be evidence of a
shared magnitude system between these dimensions. For example,
a recent study using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) indi-
cated that the parietal areas critical for time estimation are distinct
from those involved in numerosity or quantity processing (Dormal
et al., 2008). Speciﬁcally, numerosity but not time estimation was
impaired only following stimulation over the left IPS. Stimulation
over the right IPS did not result in any interference for either time or
numerosity estimation, suggesting that distinct cerebral locations
are responsible for processing time and numerosity (Dormal et al.,
2008). Similarly, Alexander, Cowey, and Walsh (2005) showed that
TMS on the right posterior parietal lobe impairs (i.e. increases reac-
tion times) in a time estimation task but not in a quantity task (pitch
comparison, Alexander et al., 2005).
1.5. The neuropsychology of time, numbers and space
As far as we are aware, there has been no neuropsychological
research that has directly investigated time, numbers and space
within the same study. However, a few studies have focused on
one or two of these dimensions and have reported selective impair-
ments of time, numbers or space processing (e.g. time: Harrington,
Lee, Boyd, Rapcsak, & Knight, 2004; Koch, Oliveri, Torriero, &
Caltagirone, 2003; Meck, 2005; numbers: Cipolotti, Butterworth, &
Denes, 1991; Lemer, Dehaene, Spelke, & Cohen, 2003; space: Driver
& Vuilleumier, 2001). For instance, studies investigating space and
numbers in patients with neglect showed similar impairment in
processing the left hand side of physical lines and of mental num-
ber lines (Zorzi, Priftis, & Umiltà, 2002 but see Doricchi, Guariglia,
Gasparini, & Tomaiuolo, 2005 for a different pattern of results).
This association of spatial and numerical impairment seems to
partially depend on the spatial orientation of the physical and num-
ber lines (Cappelletti, Freeman, & Cipolotti, 2007). Lesion studies
exploring time, number and space processing within the same
study are clearly needed to test whether these dimensions are
implemented by independent magnitude systems or by a common
one.
This study reports for the ﬁrst time a patient with a selective
impairment in time processing following a right hemisphere lesion.
We tested: (1) whether number and space processing were also
impaired or spared; (2) whether there was any interaction between
these dimensions, and the nature of any such interaction, i.e. unidi-
rectional or bidirectional. Our reasoning was as follows: (i) if there is
a fully shared magnitude system between time, numbers and space,
then impairment in one of these three magnitude dimensions
should coincide with impairments in the other two dimensions;
sychologia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2735
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Table 1
Summary of patient CB and control subjects’ cognitive scores (number correct; per-
centiles or cut-off points in parenthesis).
Tasks performed Patient CB
General intellectual functioning
NART I.Q. 120
WAIS-R verbal I.Q. 113
WAIS-R performance I.Q. 91
Memory
Recognition memory test
Words 46/50 (>75th %ile)
Faces 45/50 (>75th %ile)
Word retrieval
Graded difﬁculty naming test 27/30 (>75th %ile)
Executive functions
WCST No. categories 5/6
Hayling 6 (average)
Attention
Elevator counting 7/7 (normal)
Elevator counting with distractors 9/10 (>75th %ile)
Perception
Incomplete letters 20/20 (>5% cut-off)
Dot counting 10/10 (>5% cut-off)
Cube analysis 10/10 (>5% cut-off)
Neglect
Balloon Lateralized inattention index >45%
(normal)
Bell crossing 15 right; 17 left
Line bisection 0.8 mm to the right
Calculation and number reading
GDA test (N = 24) 10 (average)M. Cappelletti et al. / Neurop
ii) conversely, if time, numbers and space processes are indepen-
ent, then it should be possible to reveal selective impairments in
ome of them; selective impairments may also be predicted follow-
ng the hypothesis that there are dimension-speciﬁc processes as
ell as a partly shared common magnitude system; (iii) interac-
ions between magnitude dimensions are predicted based on the
dea of a partly shared common magnitude system or operational
echanisms. Our experiments tested for any interaction between
he magnitude dimensions we studied, i.e. of numbers on time and
pace, of time on numbers, and of space on numbers.
. Participants
.1. Patient CB
.1.1. Case history
CB is a 62-year-old right-handed native English-speaking man
ith university education. In 2004 he sustained a right middle cere-
ral artery territory infarct. The present research was conducted in
007.
.1.2. MRI ﬁndings
An MRI-scan showed an extensive right hemisphere lesion
nvolving the right inferior parietal regions extending to the right
uperior temporal lobe. Damage was also shown in the right infe-
ior frontal and lateral prefrontal areas around the Silvian ﬁssure
xtending deeply into the insula and the right basal ganglia. The
ntraparietal sulcus (IPS) was intact and the cerebellum was nor-
al (see Fig. 1A and B and Appendices A and B). In order to measure
he volume occupied by the patient’s lesion relative to the whole
rain, CBs lesion was plotted from the clinical MR scan onto a stan-
ard CH2 template using MRIcro software (www.mricro.com). After
onversion of regions of interest (ROIs) to voxels of interest (VOIs),
he volume of the patient’s lesion and of the whole brain was esti-
ated using MIPAV software (Centre for Information Technology,
ethesda, MD). Using this technique, it was calculated that the
atient’s lesion occupied 19.8% of the whole brain volume.
.1.3. Neuropsychological examination
The patient was referred to the Neuropsychology Department of
he National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery in London
or the evaluation of his cognitive impairments. The neuropsycho-
ogical assessment took place around the time of the experimental
nvestigation. The results are reported in Table 1.
On the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), the patient obtained a high
verage verbal I.Q. and average performance I.Q. suggesting a
ild degree of intellectual underfunctioning only on test with a
on-verbal component. Visual and verbal memory functions were
ormal. Similarly, nominal and frontal executive functions were
lso entirely normal. Two subtests from the Test of Everyday Atten-
ion (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1996) were
dministered to assess our patient’s attention. His performance
as normal both on the ‘elevator counting’ and on the ‘elevator
ounting with distractors’. The patient performed ﬂawlessly on
hree subtests from the VOSP (Warrington & James, 1991), and he
btained a score in the 10 grade on the Graded Difﬁculty Arith-
etic Test (Jackson & Warrington, 1986), corresponding to average
erformance. Moreover, there was no evidence of neglect as his per-
ormance on three tests sensitive to neglect was intact. In summary,
he patient had only a mild degree of intellectual underfunctioning
n the non-verbal part of the WAIS-R.Nevertheless, the patient reported a number of difﬁculties in
veryday life related to processing time. He complained of not being
ble to make plans involving time. For example he was very bad at
eciding when it was the right time to leave home to be on time for
n appointment. Similarly, he often grossly misjudged the amountReading 1–4 Arabic numbers (N = 40) 98.7
NART = National Adult Reading Test; %ile = percentile; WCST = Wisconsin card sorting
test; GDA = Graded Difﬁculty Arithmetic Test.
of time that was needed to come back and for everyday activities
such as for example shopping and personal care. As a result of this,
his daily routine became somewhat erratic. Examination of time
processing based on paper-and-pencil tasks was ﬁrst administered
to evaluate CBs time processing abilities. Moreover, since difﬁcul-
ties in processing time may be related to numerical impairments
we administered a series of numeracy and quantity processing tests
(see Section 2.3).
2.2. Control subjects
Overall 18 neurologically healthy control subjects participated
in the study (8 males, mean age: 63.8 years, SD 3.2). They were
matched to the patient for age and I.Q. The patient and all con-
trol subjects gave informed written consent to participate in the
study in accordance with the local research ethics committee.
They performed all paper-and-pencil and computer-based tasks.
Speciﬁcally, 5 subjects performed Task 5 (time discrimination), 8
subjects performed Tasks 1 and 3 (time estimation) and Tasks 6–8
(space and space and numbers), 12 subjects (4 new) performed
Tasks 2 and 4 (numerosity estimation). In total, six control sub-
jects took part in all experimental tasks, with the exception of Task
5 which was modiﬁed from an existing paradigm (Oliveri et al.,
2008).
2.3. Preliminary investigation: time, numeracy and space
processingThree paper-and-pencil tasks were used to assess time. The ‘time
estimation’ task required participants to estimate the time needed
to perform familiar actions (e.g. making a cup of tea) or the duration
of events (e.g. ﬂying from London to New York). The ‘knowledge of
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xact temporal facts’ task required participants to answer questions
bout exact temporal facts (e.g. how many hours in a day?). The
time comparison’ task required participants to indicate the later
ime among two (e.g. ‘22.30’ vs ‘22.53’).
Numeracy processing was assessed with eight tasks, ﬁve tasks
equiring estimation of numbers, areas and calculation, and three
equiring exact numeracy processing. Numerosity estimation was
ssessed with the following tasks: (1) Numerical estimation task,
equiring participants to estimate the size of objects (e.g. the area
f a tennis court) or the number of items in a set (e.g. the number
f eyelashes on one eyelid). (2) Number comparison estimation,
here participants were asked to select the target number closer
n magnitude to a 1-to-4 digit reference number. (3) Calculation
stimation, requiring participants to approximate the result of
rithmetical operations without calculating it. (4) Area estimation,
equiring participants to estimate and compare, in two different
asks, the area covered by two sets of square ﬁgures. (5) Number
f squares estimation, requiring participants to estimate and com-
are, in two different tasks, the number of squares contained in two
ectangular ﬁgures.
Exact numeracy processing was assessed with three tasks: (1)
nowledge of exact number facts, requiring to answer questions
apping knowledge of exact number facts (e.g. how many strings
re on the guitar?). (2) Knowledge of arithmetical facts requiring
articipants to answer questions such as ‘3 × 9’ or ‘7 + 8’. (3) Number
omparison requiring subjects to indicate the larger between two
umbers.
Space processing was assessed with general background tasks
see above). In addition, we used a ‘Location Detection’ task where
articipants had to identify the position of dots on the monitor.
single black dot (1.8◦ of visual angle) was randomly presented in
ne of four quadrants of the computer monitor (upper left and right,
ower left and right) with an eccentricity of 8◦ of visual angle relative
o the central ﬁxation point. Each trial consisted of a ﬁxation point
resented in the middle of the monitor for 200 ms, followed by a
ingle dot for 100 ms. Stimuli were presented on the four quadrants
ith equal frequency in pseudo-random order over two blocks of
20 stimuli each. Participants had to verbally report whether each
ot was presented on the upper left or right, lower left or right
uadrant of the monitor. Answers were recorded and scored by the
xperimenter.
Correct answers were given a score of 1; in tasks requiring an
stimate, correct answers were within 2 standard deviations from
ontrols. Relative to control subjects patient CB was impaired at
time estimation’ task as he misjudged the duration of familiar
vents or the time required to perform actions (based on the signif-
cance test (ST) of Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford, Howell,
able 2
atient CB and control subjects’ performance in (A) time and (B) numeracy process-
ng (number of correct responses and standard deviation in control subjects).
asks performed Patient CB Control subjects
. Time processing
Time estimation task (N = 30) 12 28.9 (3.5)
Knowledge of exact temporal facts (N = 20) 19 19.6 (2.3)
Time comparison task (N = 15) 14 14.7 (2.9)
. Numeracy processing
Numerical estimation task (N = 30) 24 28.3 (3.4)
Number comparison estimation (N = 24) 22 22.1 (3.2)
Calculation estimation (N = 18) 16 17.01 (4.2)
Area estimation (N = 52) 46 48.6 (4.6)
Number of squares estimation (N = 52) 44 48.1 (3.8)
Knowledge of exact number facts (N = 20) 19 20 (0)
Knowledge of arithmetical facts (N = 60) 57 56.4 (2.3)
Number comparison (N = 68) 68 68 (0)logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
& Garthwaite, 1998), ST: t(9) = 4.6, p < 0.001, see Table 2A.1 In con-
trast, his ‘knowledge of exact temporal facts’ and ‘time comparison’
were preserved (no difference with control subjects, ST: t(9) = 0.25,
p < 0.8 and ST: t(9) = 0.23, p = 0.82, respectively, see Table 2B). Rela-
tive to control subjects, the patient’s numerosity estimation and
exact numeracy processing were both preserved (ST: t(9) = 0.15,
p < 0.4 and ST: t(9) = 0.005, p < 0.1, respectively). Control subjects
performed well in all paper-and-pencil tasks assessing time and
numeracy skills. In the Location Detection Task, patient CB correctly
indicated the position of stimuli on the monitor (113 out of 120 cor-
rect answers > 0.25 guessing rate, Binominal probability p < 0.001).
Similarly, control subjects showed no impairment in the Location
Detection Task (115 out of 120 correct answers > 0.25 guessing rate,
Binominal probability p < 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between patient CB and control subjects’ performance in this
task (ST: t(9) = 0.615, p = 0.56, n.s.).
2.4. Interim discussion
These results suggest that patient CB was impaired in pro-
cessing time. In contrast, the examination of his numeracy skills
and spatial functioning showed that they were intact. Therefore,
it seems that in patient CB time was selectively impaired, while
number and space were selectively spared. In order to provide a
more speciﬁc account of this possible selective impairment, the
experimental investigation explored CBs’ time, number and space
processing with a set of computerized tests. It is possible that the
paper-and-pencil tasks and the computerized tasks may be tapping
into different types of timing computations, for example in terms of
supra-second and sub-second intervals which may in turn involve
different systems (e.g. Ivry & Spencer, 2004; Matelli & Meck, 2000,
2004; Meck & Benson, 2002). However, our aim was to evaluate CBs
ability to process time irrespective of the time range.
3. Experimental investigation
There were ﬁve experimental sections. In sections one to three, ﬁve tasks were
used to assess time and number processing individually (Tasks 1, 2 and 4), and
time and numbers jointly (Tasks 3 and 5). In sections four and ﬁve, three tasks
were used to assess space processing individually (Task 6), and space and num-
bers jointly (Tasks 7 and 8). See Appendix C for a schematic representation of the
design of the experimental tasks used. Space and time jointly could not be tested
because of time constraints. All tasks in the ﬁve sections were administered to
patient CB and to control subjects in separate testing sessions. In all tasks, par-
ticipants sat in a quiet room facing the computer screen with their head on a
chinrest. The viewing distance from the computer monitor was 50 cm. Stimulus
presentation and data collection were controlled using the Cogent Graphics tool-
box (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) and Matlab7 software on a S2VP Sony
laptop computer. The dimensions of the display, as rendered on the built-in liquid-
crystal screen, were 23.5 cm horizontal × 18 cm vertical. The display had a resolution
of 640 × 480 pixels and was refreshed at a frequency of 60 Hz. When oral responses
were made, these were recorded and scored by the experimenter. As we were inter-
ested in the participants’ response accuracy rather than their speed, un-timed oral
answers were required in Tasks 1–4 and reaction times were not recorded in these
tasks. Prior to the beginning of each task, 10 initial trials were given to the partici-
pants for training purposes. These trials were not included in analysis.4. Data analysis
In Tasks 1–4 participants’ accuracy in time and numerosity tasks
was assessed in the following way. First, we used linear regres-
sion to estimate the slope relating veridical to estimated time and
1 It may be claimed that the task assessing knowledge of temporal facts may not
necessarily tap into time processing as it can potentially be answered with basic
semantic knowledge, without having to compute the elapsed duration. However,
whether it was the ability to compute time or the semantic knowledge referring to
it, CBs performance in paper-and-pencil tasks suggests that his time processing was
impaired.
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umerosity judgements. If estimates were veridical, the value of
his slope should be unity (1), while over- or underestimations
hould result in values larger or smaller than unity respectively.
econd, to assess whether the slopes obtained from the control
ubjects were signiﬁcantly different from unity, we constructed
ithin-subjects 95% conﬁdence intervals (Cousineau, 2005) based
n the standard deviation of the slope estimate. Conﬁdence inter-
als that included 1 would indicate no signiﬁcant deviation from
he prediction of veridical estimation. This conﬁdence interval was
lso used to assess whether CBs performance lay within the nor-
al range using Crawford et al.’s method (Crawford & Garthwaite,
002, 2005; Crawford et al., 1998). In Tasks 1–4 we also tested the
ossible interactions between time and numbers, i.e. any effect of
he duration and the size of the individual stimuli (only numerical
timuli for size) on estimates of duration and numerosity.
For the Time Discrimination task (Task 5), a similar method of
sychometric function ﬁtting as above was used to derive the test
uration that was perceptually equivalent to the reference duration
i.e. the point of subjective equivalence, PSE).
For the Line Length Discrimination Task (Task 6), analysis pro-
eeded by ﬁrst plotting the psychometric function relating the
robability of ‘test longer’ responses against the actual test line
ength. This function should typically increase from 0% to 100%,
ith 50% found where test length is perceptually equal to the ref-
rence line length (i.e. the point of subjective equivalence, PSE). A
ogistic function was then ﬁtted to the data, using a least-squares
lgorithm (c.f. Wichmann & Hill, 2001). The aim of this procedure
as to obtain the PSE and also the Just Noticeable Difference (JND)
or each participant. The JND measures the minimal difference in
ength between test and reference lines that can be discriminated
ith reliable accuracy. The JND was computed by reading off from
he ﬁtted psychometric function the line lengths at which 25% and
5% of the responses were ‘test longer’, then dividing the difference
etween these line lengths by two (Coren, Ward, & Enns, 1999). To
stablish the extent to which CBs performance differed from the
ontrol subjects, CBs JND was expressed as a z-score relative to the
ontrols’ JNDs.
A one-tailed signiﬁcance test (ST) was used to compare the
atient with the control group (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002;
rawford et al., 1998). This test treats an individual patient as a
ample, affording the comparison of the patient with the control
roup. One-tailed revised standardised difference test (RSDT) was
sed to test whether the discrepancy between scores on two tasks
bserved for a patient is signiﬁcantly different from the discrepan-
ies in the control sample (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2005; Crawford,
ray, & Garthwaite, 2003). The ‘SingSlope’ program (Crawford &
arthwhaite, 2005) was also used to compare the slope of the
egression line of the patient with that of the control group. For all
he tasks administered, the patient’s performance was compared
ith that of all controls. Additionally, given that a different num-
er of participants was used in various tasks, CBs performance was
lso compared to the subgroup of controls that performed all the
xperimental tasks.
Other standard non-parametric (e.g. Kruskal–Wallis) and para-
etric statistical tests (e.g. ANOVA, t-test) were also used to analyze
esults from the patient and the control sample, respectively.
.1. Section 1. Time processing2A ‘time estimation’ task (Task 1) was used where participants
ere required to estimate the duration of a set of stimuli. Stimuli
onsisted of circles with a diameter of 1.72◦ of visual angle, pre-
2 We use the term ‘Time processing’ to refer all the types of manipulation of tem-
oral information, therefore including ‘Time estimation’ and ‘Time discrimination’.logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2737
sented one at the time in the middle of the screen. The circles
appeared in one or eight pre-selected colours (white, pink, red,
green, yellow, grey, brown and blue) on a mid-grey background of
luminance 44 cd/m2.
Each trial started with a central white cross that remained in
the middle of the screen until subjects pressed the spacebar. Stim-
uli were presented one at a time in the central position until the
selected time interval was completed. The number of stimuli ranged
from 9 to 100. The end of a trial was indicated by the presenta-
tion of another white cross in the middle of the screen (Fig. 2A).
The total duration of the sequence of stimuli was varied randomly
over successive trials across four durations: 15, 30, 45 and 60 s. For
data analysis, these sequence durations were grouped into two cat-
egories: short (15 and 30 s) and long (45 and 60 s). In successive
trials, individual stimulus presentation times were sampled ran-
domly from one of two continuous ranges: fast (200–1100 ms) and
slow (1101–2000 ms). Each combination of stimulus duration (slow
vs fast) and trial duration (short vs long) was sampled with equal
frequency in 2 blocks of 16 trials each. At the end of each trial, par-
ticipants were asked to estimate its duration in seconds or minutes
and to verbally report their answer to the experimenter. There was
no time constraint to produce an answer.
In order to prevent sub-vocal counting and to avoid strategies
used to keep track of elapsing seconds, participants were required
to name aloud the colour of each circle in each trial, following a
procedure used in previous studies (e.g. Logie & Baddeley, 1987).
Moreover, the fast presentation of the stimuli (i.e. 200–1100 ms for
half of the trials) was designed to further prevent any sub-vocal
counting.
4.1.1. Results: time processing
In Task 1, patient CB consistently underestimated the duration of
temporal intervals when coloured circles were used while perform-
ing a secondary task, i.e. colour naming (slope = 0.42, Standard Error
(SE) = 0.045, signiﬁcantly different from 1, p < 0.05, Fig. 2B). Con-
trol subjects showed no impairment in time estimation with these
stimuli (slope = 0.955, SE = 0.08, not signiﬁcantly different from 1,
Fig. 2B). CBs performance was signiﬁcantly different from control
subjects [Satterthwaite’s test (SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test
(Test a)): t(2) = −3.4, p < 0.03], even when compared to the subgroup
of controls that performed all experimental tasks [Satterthwaite’s
test (SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test d.1)): t(2) = −6.9,
p < 0.001].
4.1.2. Interaction of stimulus duration on time estimation
An analysis was run to test whether performance was inﬂuenced
by the duration of the individual stimuli. This showed that CBs
time estimation was not inﬂuenced by the duration of the indi-
vidual stimuli [Kruskal–Wallis main effect of stimulus duration,
2 = 1.09, p = 0.2, n.s.]. Thus the perceived duration of the whole
sequence of events was neither shorter with short event dura-
tions (slope = 0.20, SE = 0.05), nor longer with long event durations
(slope = 0.23, SE = 0.038).
Similarly, control subjects’ time estimation was not inﬂuenced
by the duration of the individual stimuli [F(1, 8) = 0.11, p = 0.74, n.s.].
The effect of stimulus duration on time estimation did not differ
between CB and the control group for both short [Satterthwaite’s
test (SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test d.1)): t(31) = −0.68,
p = 0.49, n.s.] and long durations [Satterthwaite’s test (SingSlope,
Crawford & Howell’s test (Test d.1)): t(31) = −0.7, p = 0.5, n.s]. This
was also the case when CBs performance was compared to the
subgroup of controls that performed all experimental tasks [short
durations: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = −1.23,
p < 0.22, n.s.; long durations: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test
(Test c): t(5) = −4.8, p < 0.4, n.s.].
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umerosity estimation of non-numerical stimuli (coloured circles). Estimated durati
nd numerosity respectively (left panels) and as slopes (right panels) with 95% conﬁ
.2. Section 2. Numerosity processingA Numerosity Estimation task (Task 2) was used where par-
icipants were required to estimate the numerosity of a set of
timuli.3 The stimuli and experimental design of this task were
dentical to those used for the ‘time estimation’ task. The cir-
3 Although number and numerosity processing as well as the mechanisms for
xtracting sequential and simultaneous numerosity may engage different systems
nd are expected to lead to different computations, it was beyond the scope of the
resent study to investigate any differences in how such systems relate to time and
pace processing.Tasks 1 and 2; (B) performance of patient CB and control subjects in time and (C)
n s) and numerosities (number of items) are expressed as a function of real duration
e limits for patient CB and control subjects.
cles were presented in 2 blocks of 16 trials each. As previously,
counting strategies were prevented by asking subjects to name the
colour of each circle. There was no time constraint to produce an
answer.
4.2.1. Results: numerosity processing
Patient CB could correctly estimate the number of circlespresented [slope = 1.01, SE = 0.03, not signiﬁcantly different from
1, Fig. 2C]. Similarly, control subjects showed no impairment in
numerosity estimation with these stimuli [slope = 0.9, SE = 0.01
not signiﬁcantly different from 1]. There was no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between patient CB and control subjects’ performance in
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umerosity estimation [Satterthwaite’s test (SingSlope, Crawford
Howell’s test (Test a)): t(14) = 0.29, p = 0.39, n.s.], even when CBs
erformance was directly compared to the subgroup of controls
hat performed all experimental tasks [SingSlope, Crawford &
owell’s test (Test c): t(5) = 0.46, p < 0.66, n.s.].
A signiﬁcant difference between time and numerosity estima-
ion with non-numerical stimuli was found in patient CB relative to
ontrol subjects [RSDT: t(11) = 3.02, p < 0.04], such that only time but
ot numerosity processing was impaired. This difference was sig-
iﬁcant even when CBs performance was directly compared to the
ubgroup of controls that performed all experimental tasks [RSDT:
(5) = 4.41, p = 0.006]. The patient’s pattern of performance there-
ig. 3. Task 3: Time and numerosity processing tested jointly. (A) Design of Tasks 3 and
stimation of small (1–4) and large (6–9) numerical stimuli. Estimated durations (in s) an
umerosity respectively (patient CB, left panels) and as slopes (right panels) with 95% conlogia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2739
fore fulﬁlled the criteria for a classical dissociation (Crawford &
Garthwaite, 2005; Crawford et al., 2003).
4.3. Section 3. Time and numbers
There were three experimental tasks. The ﬁrst two tasks (Tasks
3 and 4) used an identical experimental design as the time and
numerosity estimation tasks (see Tasks 1 and 2). The only differ-
ence was in the stimuli used. Arabic numerals ranging from 1 to
9 (except 5) were presented instead of circles (Fig. 3A). In two
different sessions, participants were asked to estimate either the
duration of a trial or the number of Arabic numerals contained in
4; (B) performance of patient CB and control subjects in time and (C) numerosity
d numerosities (number of items) are expressed as a function of real duration and
ﬁdence limits for patient CB and control subjects.
2 sycho
e
e
w
o
d
d
t
w
a
t
s
(
a
r
a
t
h
c
w
a
m
t
t
H
T
‘
e
e
c
o
t
p
T
6
T
(
w
e
s
o
T
p
t
t
S
l
s
O
1
o
m
t
o
u
4
w
t
i
s
C
C
e
H740 M. Cappelletti et al. / Neurop
ach trial. In order to test whether the size of the numbers inﬂu-
nced time or numerosity estimation, 2 sets of numerical stimuli
ere used: small numbers (1–4) and large numbers (6–9). More-
ver, in order to test whether there was any effect of temporal
iscrimination on numerical information we used two stimulus
urations: fast (200–1100 ms) and slow (1101–2000 ms). Trials con-
aining either small or large numbers of either slow or fast duration
ere randomly presented in equal proportion in 4 blocks of 16 tri-
ls each (total = 64). In 2 blocks participants were asked to estimate
he duration of the trial (time estimation). In the other two blocks
ubjects were asked to estimate the number of stimuli presented
numerosity estimation). The order of the blocks was counterbal-
nced across subjects. During each trial, subjects were required to
ead the numbers aloud to prevent sub-vocal counting and to divert
ttention from timing. Similar to the tasks with coloured circles,
he fast presentation of the numerical stimuli (i.e. 200–1100 ms for
alf of the trials) was designed to further prevent any sub-vocal
ounting. In both the time and the numerosity estimation tasks
ith numerical stimuli there was no time constraint to produce
n answer. Responses were recorded and scored by the experi-
enter.
Since a number of studies have suggested that time intervals
end to be underestimated when subjects perform a concurrent
ask (e.g. Casini, Macar, & Grondin, 1992; Grondin & Macar, 1992;
arton, 1938; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994; Zakay, 1993; see
homas & Cantor (1978) for an exception), we used an additional
Time Discrimination’ task (Task 5). This was adapted from an
xisting paradigm (Oliveri et al., 2008) in order to evaluate time
stimation without a concurrent task. Participants were asked to
ompare the duration of two numerical stimuli. Stimuli consisted
f sequential pairs of centrally presented Arabic numbers sub-
ending 1.72◦ of visual angle. Trials began with a central ﬁxation
oint that remained visible until a key press from the participants.
he ﬁrst number then appeared in the middle of the screen for
00 ms followed by an ISI of 200 ms and by the second number.
he ﬁrst number was a 600 ms ﬁxed-duration reference number
‘5’) while the second number could be either ‘1’, ‘5’ or ‘9’, and
as either of a shorter or longer duration relative to the refer-
nce. A range of durations between 360 and 840 ms was used in
teps of 60 ms. These durations were chosen on the basis of previ-
us studies with neurological patients (e.g. Harrington et al., 2004).
here were 4 shorter and 4 longer durations presented in equal
roportion in 45 trials. At the end of each trial (reference, ISI and
arget stimulus), a white question mark presented in the posi-
ion of the stimulus prompted participants to make a judgment.
ubjects were required to indicate whether the second number
asted longer or shorter than the ﬁrst number using the left (for
horter) or right arrow (for longer) keys on the laptop keyboard.
nly these three target numbers rather than the whole range from
to 9 was used. This is because we aimed to keep the task’s
verall length adequate to be administered to the patient while
aximizing the chances to observe any effect of numerical magni-
ude on time perception. Therefore, only numbers at the extreme
f the single-digit range, i.e. the smallest and the largest were
sed.
.3.1. Results: time and numbers
Patient CB underestimated the duration of temporal intervals
hen Arabic numbers were used while performing a secondary
ask, i.e. reading Arabic numbers aloud [slope = 0.21, SE = 0.05 signif-
cantly different from 1, p < 0.05, Fig. 3B]. His performance differed
igniﬁcantly from control subjects [Satterthwaite’s test (SingSlope,
rawford & Howell’s test (Test a)): t(6) = −2.9, p < 0.01], even when
B was compared to the subgroup of controls that performed all
xperimental tasks [Satterthwaite’s test (SingSlope, Crawford &
owell’s test (Test d.1)): t(4) = −1.5, p = 0.035].logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
This impairment was not simply due to the fact that CB
performed a concurrent task. Indeed, he was impaired at discrimi-
nating between temporal intervals in the time discrimination task
(Task 5), which did not involve a concurrent task. In this task, he
reached only 61% correct answers for stimuli duration differing by
150 ms from the reference stimulus (not signiﬁcantly different from
50% chance level performance, Binomial probability p = 0.17), and
performed at chance with shorter stimulus durations.
In contrast, his ability to judge the number of Arabic stimuli
presented in an interval was intact (slope = 1.02, SE = 0.04, not sig-
niﬁcantly different from 1, Fig. 3C). His performance did not differ
signiﬁcantly from control subjects [Aspin’s test (SingSlope, Craw-
ford & Howell’s test (Test b)): t(28) = 0.147, p = 0.44, n.s.], even when
CB was compared to the subgroup of controls that performed all
experimental tasks [Aspin’s test (SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s
test (Test b)): t(9) = 2.77, p = 0.3, n.s.].
Control subjects showed no signiﬁcant impairment estimat-
ing either time [slope = 0.96, SE = 0.08, not signiﬁcantly different
from 1, Fig. 3B] or numerosity when Arabic numbers were used
[slope = 0.97, SE = 0.01 not signiﬁcantly different from 1, Fig. 3C].
Their performance in the time discrimination task was also intact,
i.e. they reached ceiling performance (100% correct) for stimuli dif-
fering in duration by 150 ms from the reference stimulus.
4.3.2. Interactions
4.3.2.1. Stimuli size and duration on time processing. Time estimation
(Task 3): Despite being impaired, CBs’ time estimation was modu-
lated by the quantity expressed by numbers [Kruskal–Wallis main
effect of stimulus size, 2 = 2.145, p < 0.003, see Fig. 3B]. Strikingly,
smaller numbers (i.e. 1–4) resulted in more marked underestima-
tion of time [slope = 0.11, SE = 0.07] relative to bigger numbers [i.e.
6–9, slope = 0.29, SE = 0.01].
As for Task 1, we tested whether performance was inﬂuenced
by the duration of the individual stimuli. This analysis showed that
the patient’s time estimation was not inﬂuenced by the duration of
the individual stimuli [Kruskal–Wallis main effect of stimulus dura-
tion, 2 = −1.07, p = 0.3, n.s.]. Therefore, stimuli of short durations
did not result in perceiving intervals as lasting shorter [slope = 0.58,
SE = 0.071], or stimuli of long durations in perceiving intervals as
lasting longer [slope = 0.61, SE = 0.04].
Separate regression analyses were performed for each con-
trol subject to derive individual slope estimates for small and
large numbers, which were then entered into an ANOVA. This
showed that control subjects’ time estimation was inﬂuenced by
the quantity expressed by numbers [F(1, 7) = 12.19, p < 0.01, Fig. 3B].
Therefore, big numbers (i.e., 6–9) resulted in perceiving longer
durations [i.e., 6–9, slope = 1.23, SE = 0.18] relative to small num-
bers [i.e., 1–4, slope = 1.00, SE = 0.2]. There was also a trend for
a signiﬁcant effect of the stimuli duration of the perceived over-
all duration, such that stimuli lasting longer tended to make the
overall interval being perceived as lasting longer [F(1, 7) = 5.56,
p = 0.051].
The effect of stimulus duration on time estimation did not dif-
fer between CB and the control group for both short [SingSlope,
Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(7) = 0.13, p = 0.44, n.s.] and long
durations [SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(7) = 0.67,
p = 0.25, n.s.]. This difference was not signiﬁcant even when the
patient’s performance was compared to the subgroup of controls
that performed all experimental tasks [short durations: SingSlope,
Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = −0.23, p = 0.3, n.s.; long
durations: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = 0.12,
p = 0.48, n.s.].
In contrast, CBs underestimation of temporal durations was even
more dramatic relative to control subjects for both small [SingS-
lope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(7) = 5.32, p < 0.01] and
large number values [SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c):
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(7) = 3.08, p < 0.04], even with compared with the controls’ sub-
roup [small number values: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test
Test c): t(5) = 8.11, p < 0.001] and large number values [SingSlope,
rawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = 4.3, p < 0.03].
Time discrimination (Task 5): An analysis on the values indicating
roportion of test ‘longer’ responses for each number indicated that
Bs’ performance was not modulated by the quantity expressed by
umbers stimuli [Kruskal–Wallis main effect of number quantity,
2 = 5.01, p = 0.08, n.s.].
In contrast, control subjects’ ability to discriminate between
emporal durations was modulated by the quantity expressed by
umbers [F(2, 8) = 7.17, p = 0.017]. The results of ﬁtting PSEs to the
ontrol data revealed that relative to the test value ‘5’, the dura-
ion of the test value of ‘9’ had to be 44 ms shorter (t(4) = −3.50,
< 0.02) in order to be perceived as equal to the reference stim-
lus ‘5’ whereas for the test value ‘1’ had to be only 5 ms shorter
t(4) = −0.33, p = 0.76, n.s.], see Appendix 1.
.3.2.2. Stimuli size and duration on numerosity estimation. CBs’
umerosity estimation was inﬂuenced by the quantity expressed
y numbers [Kruskal–Wallis main effect of stimuli size, 2 = 4.14,
< 0.01]. Therefore, smaller numbers resulted in the interval being
erceived as containing fewer stimuli [slope = 0.99, SE = 0.05] and
arger numbers in the interval being perceived as containing more
timuli [slope = 1.1, SE = 0.07, Fig. 3C]. In contrast, the patient’s
umerosity estimation was not inﬂuenced by the stimuli duration
Kruskal–Wallis main effect of stimuli duration, 2 = 1.02, p = 0.35,
.s.].
Separate regression analyses were performed for each control
ubject to derive individual slope estimates for small and large
umbers, which were then entered into an ANOVA. This showed
hat control subjects’ numerosity estimation was inﬂuenced by the
uantity expressed by numbers [F(1, 11) = 21.7, p < 0.001]. There-
ore, smaller numbers resulted in the interval being perceived as
ontaining fewer stimuli [slope = 0.90, SE = 0.04] and larger num-
ers in the interval being perceived as containing more stimuli
slope = 1.06, SE = 0.09, see Fig. 3C). In contrast, controls’ numeros-
ty estimation was not inﬂuenced by the stimuli duration [F(1,
1) = 3.48, p = 0.4, n.s.].
The effect of stimuli duration on numerosity estimation did not
iffer between CB and the control group [short duration: SingS-
ope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(11) = 0.13, p = 0.44, n.s.; long
uration: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(11) = 0.29,
= 0.7, n.s.]. This difference was also not signiﬁcant when CB was
ompared to the subgroup of controls that performed all experi-
ental tasks [short duration: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test
Test c): t(5) = 0.8, p = 0.52, n.s.; long duration: SingSlope, Crawford
Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = 0.35, p = 0.67, n.s.].
Likewise, the effect of stimuli size on numerosity estimation did
ot differ between CB and both the overall control group and the
ontrol subgroup [Overall group: small size: SingSlope, Crawford &
owell’s test (Test c): t(11) = 0.67, p < 0.25, n.s.; large size: SingSlope,
rawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(11) = 0.13, p = 0.44, n.s. Subgroup:
mall size: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test c): t(5) = 0.67,
= 0.25, n.s.; large size: SingSlope, Crawford & Howell’s test (Test
): t(5) = 0.41, p = 0.2, n.s.].
.3.2.3. Interim discussion. These results showed that patient CB
as selectively impaired at estimating time and that his perfor-
ance was nevertheless modulated by the quantity expressed by
umbers. In contrast, his ability to estimate numerosity was intact,
nd also modulated by number quantity. We note that tasks assess-
ng time and numerosity estimation were identical in terms of
he stimuli and the experimental procedure used, apart from the
ctual task performed. Therefore, it is unlikely that any difference
n performance between these tasks could simply be attributed tologia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2741
differences in terms of perceptual or attentional resources required
to perform the tasks. Control subjects were accurate in time and
numerosity estimation, as well as in the time discrimination task.
In these tasks their performance was modulated by the quantity
expressed by numbers.
4.4. Section 4. Space processing
A ‘Line Length Discrimination’ (Task 6) was used to test space
processing. Participants had to indicate which of two lines was
the longer. Trials began with a central ﬁxation point that remained
visible until a key press from the participants. After a blank inter-
val of 200 ms a reference and a target line were presented one
5.07◦ above the horizontal meridian and the other 5.07◦ below,
in randomized order. The lines appeared centred on the vertical
meridian one after the other for 600 ms separated by an inter-
stimulus interval of 100 ms. The reference line subtended 5.15◦ of
visual angle in length (∼4.5 cm); target lines varied in length rel-
ative to the reference by ±0.26 or 0.52◦ of visual angle (∼±0.23
or 0.45 cm). Participants indicated the line with the longer length
by depressing the upper or the lower arrow key on the computer
keyboard.
Note that the difference between the number of stimulus levels
in this task (four) versus the time discrimination (Task 5) (eight)
should not affect the measure of interest, namely just noticeable
differences (JNDs, see Section 4) which are likely to remain the
same regardless of the number of stimulus levels used to ﬁnd it.
As the aim of this experiment was to probe spatial processing in
general, we did not attempt to monitor ocular-motor behaviour
to distinguish between spatial processes that may be dependent
or independent of eye movements. Moreover, we were not moti-
vated to monitor eye gaze in CB in particular, as no deﬁcits in
eye gaze or eye movements had been reported in his medical his-
tory.
4.4.1. Results: space processing
To establish to what extent CBs’ performance in the Line Length
Discrimination Task (Task 6) differed from control subjects, CBs’
just noticeable distance (JND) was expressed as a z-score relative
to the controls’ JNDs. The controls’ JNDs had a mean (and stan-
dard deviation) of 3.54 (1.17). CBs’ JND was 5.84, and his z-score
was therefore 1.56. This result suggests that the patient’s perfor-
mance was within the normal range, i.e. that the probability of the
patient’s JND coming from same population as the controls’ was
greater than p = 0.05. A direct comparison of CBs’ and control sub-
jects’ performance (JNDs) also conﬁrmed that these did not differ
[ST: t(7) = 1.85, p = 0.11, n.s.] even when CB was compared to the
control subgroup [ST: t(5) = 0.46, p = 0.33, n.s.].
4.5. Section 5. Space and numbers
Two tasks were used to test space and number processes
together. The ﬁrst task (Task 7) was based on a classical experimen-
tal paradigm used to reveal implicit spatial–numerical associations
(known as the SNARC effect, Dehaene et al., 1993). Subjects initiated
each block by pressing the spacebar. Each trial began with a central
ﬁxation cross for 200 ms, after which Arabic numbers from 1 to 9
(excluding 5) were centrally presented one at the time for 200 ms.
There were two blocks of 128 stimuli each, thus each Arabic number
was presented 32 times. Participants had to decide whether each of
the numbers presented was odd or even, i.e. parity judgment task.
Stimuli remained on the screen until participants made an answer
or for a maximum of 1500 ms. Following a procedure commonly
used when administering this task (Dehaene et al., 1993), partic-
ipants responded by depressing either the left (odd numbers) or
the right (even numbers) arrow keys of the keyboard. The assign-
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ent of the ‘odd’ and ‘even’ responses to the left and right key was
eversed in the two blocks and the order of the instructions was
ounterbalanced across subjects.
The second task (Task 8) was number comparison, where partic-
pants had to decide whether a number was larger or smaller than
he reference ‘5’. Each block started with the word ‘Experimen-
al Task’ that remained in the middle of the screen until subjects
ressed the spacebar. This was followed by a central ﬁxation cross
resented for 200 ms after which Arabic numbers from 1 to 9
excluding 5) were presented one at the time for 200 ms. There
ere 2 blocks of 128 single-digit Arabic numbers each. Numbers
ppeared at a visual angle of 4.89◦ either to the left or the right
f the ﬁxation point on the computer monitor, following a proce-
ure previously used in other studies (e.g. Lavidor, Brinksman, &
öbel, 2004). Participants had to decide whether each number was
arger or smaller than 5. In one block, they were requested to press
left key of the keyboard if the number presented was smaller
han 5 and a right key if the number was larger than 5. The instruc-
ions were reversed for the following block and the order of the
nstructions was counterbalanced across participants. The lateral-
zed presentation of the numerical stimuli aimed to test whether
here was any interaction of space on numerical processing, i.e.
hether judgments of number magnitude could be modulated by
he spatial location of the numbers on the screen. On the basis of
he hypothesis that numbers are represented along a left-to-right
riented mental line (Dehaene et al., 1993), participants’ response
imes in both tasks were expected to be faster when small numbers
ere answered with the left hand and when large numbers were
nswered with the right hand.
.5.1. Results: space and numbers
Patient CB was accurate at judging the parity of numbers (Task
) as well as at comparing their magnitude (Task 8) (91.4% and 98%
orrect answers, respectively). In the number comparison task, the
atient’s response times decreased as a function of the numerical
istance from number 5 [r2 = 0.128, p < 0.001], therefore indicating
normal distance effect (Moyer & Landauer, 1967).
Control subjects were accurate at indicating the parity status
f numbers (96.8% correct answers) and the larger between two
umbers (98.7% correct answers). Their performance in magni-
ude comparison was modulated by the numerical distance from
he reference number ‘5’ [r2 = 0.58, p < 0.006]. Patient CBs’ accu-
acy did not signiﬁcantly differ from the overall control group
nd from the controls’ subgroup in either tasks [overall control
roup: parity judgment: ST: t(7) = −0.24, p = 0.75, n.s.; magni-
ude ST: t(7) = −0.31, p = 0.76, n.s.; controls subgroup: parity ST:
(5) = −0.89, p = 0.21, n.s.; magnitude ST: t(5) = −0.66, p = 0.27, n.s.].
owever, CBs response times were signiﬁcantly slower than con-
rols in both tasks [parity judgment: mean RTs control subjects:
19.3 ms, patient CB: 1242.14 ms; ST: t(7) = 8.670, p < 0.001; magni-
ude comparison: mean RTs control subjects: 461.3 ms, patient CB:
43.8 ms; ST: t(7) = 13.42, p < 0.001]. This was also the case when
he patient was compared to the controls’ subgroup in both tasks
parity judgment: t(5) = 21.9, p < 0.001; magnitude comparison: ST:
(5) = 4.65, p < 0.002].
.5.2. Interactions
.5.2.1. Numbers on space processing. In the parity judgment task,
he slope of the linear regression between [right–left] key presses
nd each number presented was calculated for each participant.
n patient CB this analysis showed a superiority of the left hand
o answer small numbers and of the right hand to answer large
umbers [r2 = 0.167, p < 0.03]. Therefore, large numbers on the right
ere answered about 22 ms faster than on the left, and the opposite
as true for small numbers (i.e. 18 ms difference between left and
ight). This is consistent with the SNARC effect and suggests that CBslogia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
spatial representation of numbers along a mental line is preserved
(Dehaene et al., 1993).
Similarly, control subjects were faster at processing small num-
bers with the left hand and large numbers with the right hand
[r2 = 0.68, p < 0.001]. These results suggest an interaction of num-
ber over space processing in both patient CB and control subjects,
with no difference between them [overall control group: RSDT:
t(7) = −0.33, p = 0.37, n.s.; controls’ subgroup: RSDT: t(5) = 0.69,
p = 0.25, n.s.].
4.5.2.2. Space on number processing. In the number comparison
task, CBs’ ability to judge the magnitude of numbers was modu-
lated by their location on the computer monitor [Kruskal–Wallis
main effect of space, 2 = 8.68, p < 0.03]. Speciﬁcally, small num-
bers were judged faster when presented on the left side of the
monitor [Mann–Whitney U, 2 = −2.93, p < 0.03,] and large numbers
when presented on the right side of the monitor [Mann–Whitney
U, 2 = −6.32, p < 0.001].
Control subjects’ performance was also modulated by the loca-
tion of the stimuli on the monitor [F(1, 7) = 7.93, p < 0.02], such
that they were faster at judging the magnitude of small numbers
when presented on the left side of the monitor [t(7) = 2.41, p = 0.034]
and of large numbers when presented on the right side [t(7) = 2.5,
p < 0.030]. Consistent with previous studies using a similar experi-
mental paradigm (e.g. Lavidor et al., 2004), these results suggest an
interaction of space over number processing in both patient CB and
control subjects, with no difference between them [overall control
group: RSDT: t(7) = −0.146, p = 0.44, n.s.; controls’ subgroup: RSDT:
t(5) = 1.1, p = 0.16, n.s.].
5. Discussion
In this study, we undertook for the ﬁrst time a detailed inves-
tigation of time, number and space processing in a patient with a
right hemisphere lesion.
5.1. A selective impairment in time processing
Our results indicated that patient CB was selectively impaired
in processing time. In contrast, number and space processing were
preserved. CBs’ impairment in time processing encompassed both
the ability to estimate temporal intervals as well as the ability to
discriminate between temporal durations. CBs’ underestimation of
temporal intervals could be up to 1/3 of their veridical duration (e.g.
18 s for a veridical 60 s interval) and did not depend on whether
the stimuli were coloured circles or Arabic numbers. CBs’ underes-
timation of temporal intervals in the ‘time estimation’ task (Task
1) occurred while performing a concurrent task (naming colours or
reading numbers aloud). It has been reported that even healthy sub-
jects underestimate time when performing a concurrent task (e.g.
Casini & Macar, 1997; Gibbons & Rammsayer, 2004), and indeed
our control subjects showed a similar effect. Therefore it could be
argued that CBs’ underestimation may simply be due to a response-
bias in dual-task performance. However, two aspects seem to rule
out this possibility. The ﬁrst is the effect of numerical value on
time perception, i.e. a sequence of small numbers was perceived
as lasting shorter and a sequence of large numbers as lasting longer
than their veridical duration. The second aspect suggesting that
underestimations could not simply be explained by response bias
in dual-task is that CB was also impaired in the ‘time discrimina-
tion task’ where he was asked to judge which of two stimuli lasted
longer without performing any concurrent task.
It is interesting to note that CBs’ errors in temporal tasks always
consisted of underestimations. Impaired time processing may be
expected to result in random errors (i.e. a mixture of accurate
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esponses, under and over-estimations) rather than systematic ten-
ency in one direction, i.e. underestimations in this case. However,
e note that a similar tendency to underestimate temporal inter-
als has been shown in some previous neuropsychological patients
e.g. Danckert et al., 2007; Drane et al., 1999; Meck, 2005; Richards,
973; Vidalaki et al., 1999). Temporal underestimations have been
xplained in terms of the inefﬁciency of some components involved
n time processing and in particular of the pacemaker component,
lthough an isolated deﬁcit to this component does not seem suf-
cient to cause time impairment (Danckert et al., 2007). At present
t is not possible to specify which component involved in time pro-
essing was at fault in patient CB.
It might also be argued that time estimation was inﬂuenced by
he number of stimuli presented. Indeed, in the ‘time estimation’
ask (Task 1) there was a positive correlation between the number
f stimuli presented and the total duration of the sequence. Thus a
ubject who either knew the frequency of the stimuli or received
eliable feedback on their responses would be able to correctly
eport the duration of the sequence based on simply counting the
umber of items seen. However, such a strategy would have been
ifﬁcult in the present paradigm as feedback was not given, and
he frequency of stimuli was both randomized between sequences
nd varied randomly within sequences along a wide continuous
ange (e.g. within ‘fast’ and ‘slow’, as described above in Section 4.1),
hile continuous verbal output and fast presentations should have
mpaired counting of the stimuli. Despite such factors interfering
ith formation of learned associations based on correlation, control
ubjects could perform the task with near-veridical accuracy.
In striking contrast with his time impairment, CBs’ number and
pace processing were spared. In a series of paper-and-pencil tasks,
he patient showed good performance in estimating the numerosity
f a set or the area covered by objects. He could also correctly per-
orm arithmetical operations and number comparison. Moreover,
he patient performed well when asked to estimate the numerosity
f the same sets of stimuli previously used in ‘time estimation’ task,
egardless as to whether the stimuli consisted of coloured circles or
rabic numbers. Spatial processing was also entirely preserved in
atient CB. In three stringent tests used to assess neglect, CBs’ per-
ormance was normal and he also performed well in the ‘line length
iscrimination’ task (Task 6), requiring to indicate the longer of two
ines.4
It might be suggested that CBs selective impairment in time esti-
ation was simply due to time tasks being more difﬁcult than the
asks used to test numerosity and spatial estimation. Although we
annot completely rule out differences in task difﬁculty, we tried to
void this by equating the critical tasks on as many parameters as
ossible. As explained in the Methods, the tasks assessing time and
umerosity estimation (Tasks 1–4) were identical in terms of the
xperimental stimuli and procedure used, the only difference being
n the instructions given to the participants. Moreover, although we
ould not equate the line length discrimination task (Task 6) to the
ther tasks in a similar way, we note that the line length discrim-
nation task is unlikely to suffer from task difﬁculty issues. This
s because what we measured is the threshold at which subjects
ere able to detect differences between two stimuli. Speciﬁcally,
e tested participants’ ability across several difﬁculty levels rang-
ng from easy to hard to ﬁnd the ‘just noticeable difference’ (JND)
4 An anonymous reviewer suggested that the latter task might be solved by merely
oting the position of the end-points of the lines. However, we note that in order to
o so participants would have to engage in two distinct cognitive operations: ﬁrst,
oting the position of each of the line ends, and second to judge the orientation of
n imaginary line connecting them (analogous to a Vernier task). Though we cannot
iscount this possibility a priori, this explanation does not seem as parsimonious as
ne based on comparing line lengths directly.logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2743
level at 75% correct. It should arguably be similarly difﬁcult to detect
a JND in line length as it is to detect a JND in stimuli duration
regardless of how many levels are used to ﬁnd it.
Our data provide a clear single dissociation in patient CB
between impaired time processing on the one hand, and spared
number and space processing on the other. A double dissociation
among these magnitude dimensions would indeed further advance
our understanding of the relation between them. Such dissocia-
tion has yet to be reported in patients with neurological lesions.
However, the relation between time and number processing has
recently been examined in a group of six adults with develop-
mental dyscalculia (DD), an innate impairment in understanding
and manipulating numbers (e.g. Butterworth, 2005). By using a
variant of the experimental tasks employed to study patient CB,
our preliminary data show that time processing in DD is pre-
served despite numbers being impaired (Cappelletti, Freeman, &
Butterworth, forthcoming). This therefore suggests that a double
dissociation seems to exist at least between time and numbers.
5.2. Interactions between time, numbers and space
We investigated whether interactions between numbers and
time and between numbers and space occurred. We found a signif-
icant interaction between numbers and time. Thus, small numbers
(1–4) made the time intervals be perceived as shorter than its
veridical duration, and large numbers (6–9) as longer than its
veridical duration. Interestingly, the effect was present in both
patient CB and in control subjects, the only difference being that
CBs’ underestimation was even more dramatic that in controls.
This interaction of numerical quantity and time has not previously
been reported in neuropsychological patients and suggests a con-
nection between number and time processing. Numerical quantity
also interacted with the numerosity of the set (i.e. how many items),
such that small numbers made the interval be perceived as contain-
ing fewer stimuli than the veridical amount and large numbers as
containing more than the veridical amount.
Patient CB and control subjects’ estimation of time and numeros-
ity was not modulated by the duration of the stimuli, with the
exception of a trend in time estimation in control subjects. There-
fore stimuli of short duration did not make an interval be perceived
as shorter than its veridical duration or containing fewer stimuli.
Similarly, stimuli of long duration did not make an interval be per-
ceived as lasting longer than its veridical duration or containing
more stimuli. A similar unidirectional interaction between num-
bers and time has already been reported in studies based on the
Stroop paradigm and on temporal bisection (Dormal et al., 2006,
2008; Droit-Volet, 2003). This has been explained as reﬂecting the
fact that numerosity, but not time, is automatically accessed even
when task-irrelevant (e.g. Dormal et al., 2006; Droit-Volet, 2003).
This proposal found support in the several experiments showing the
automatic access to numerosity, whether this consisted of symbolic
or non-symbolic material (e.g. Dehaene & Akhavein, 1995; Koechlin,
Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1999; Tzelgov, Meyer, & Henik, 1992).
The prevalence of the numerical dimension over the temporal one
may also be the consequence of the advanced use of numbers in
the context of exact calculation (Walsh, 2003). It is also possible
that judgments on numerosity are more frequent and explicit than
those on duration (Dormal et al., 2006).
Our data do not allow us to draw strong conclusions on whether
the unidirectional interaction we found is driven by the automatic
access to numerical stimuli. We note, however, that besides the
interaction between numbers and time, our data also showed a
bidirectional interaction between numbers and space. An interac-
tion of space on number processing was observed in both patient
CB and control subjects’ judgment of number magnitude which was
modulated by the spatial location of the numbers on the computer
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onitor. Moreover, interaction of numbers on space processing was
bserved in the parity judgment task, where subjects’ judgment of
he parity status of numbers was modulated by their spatial loca-
ion on the mental number line, i.e. small on the left and large
n the right. This interaction between space and numbers is well-
ocumented in both healthy controls and neurological patients (e.g.
appelletti & Cipolotti, 2006; Dehaene et al., 1993; Doricchi et al.,
005; Hubbard et al., 2005; Zorzi et al., 2002). The effect of space
n numbers therefore suggests that not all interactions can be due
o a stronger effect of numbers relative to other magnitude codes.
Our study did not directly explore the relation between time
nd space because of time constraints. This relation has been
nvestigated by some recent studies which provided evidence of
trong interactions between these two dimensions (e.g. Casasanto
Boroditsky, 2008; Ishihara, Keller, Rossetti, & Prinz, 2008; Vallesi,
inns, & Shallice, 2008). For instance, it has been shown that sub-
ects observing differently scaled environments undergo systematic
hifts in the experience of time, such that temporal durations are
erceived as shorter in the presence of small space (De Long, 1981).
oreover, a recent study reported that subjects performing time
omparisons showed faster left-side responses to early onset tim-
ngs and faster right-side responses to late onset timings (Ishihara
t al., 2008). A link between time and space has also been indicated
y neuropsychological studies reporting the co-occurrence of spa-
ial and temporal deﬁcits in patients with neglect (Basso, Nichelli,
rassinetti, & di Pellegrino, 1996; Danckert et al., 2007). It may be
ossible that the interaction between time and space is not com-
letely symmetrical, that is time may exert a greater inﬂuenced
n space than the opposite. Although some existing studies have
hown that time also inﬂuences space processing to some extent
e.g. Ishihara et al., 2008; Vallesi et al., 2008), no studies have yet
xamined the mutual interaction of time and space within the same
xperimental paradigm.
Although the relation between time and space was not directly
nvestigated in this study, our evidence of the dissociation between
mpaired time processing and preserved numerical and spatial pro-
essing seems sufﬁcient to claim the partial independence among
hese three dimensions. Future studies are needed to complement
his evidence by directly assessing the relation between time and
pace in the context of numerical processing as well.
.3. Implications for single or multiple magnitude systems
Our ﬁndings of a selective impairment in time processing allow
s to evaluate the two main contrasting proposals suggesting that
ime, numbers and space are implemented by either distinct mag-
itude systems or by a common one. The proposal of distinct
agnitude systems can easily accommodate CBs selective impair-
ent for time. According to such proposal, distinct magnitude
ystems underpin distinct magnitude dimensions. This leads to the
rediction that one magnitude system can be impaired while the
thers continue to work normally. However, we found that num-
er quantity modulated the participants’ perception of time even in
atient CB despite his time impairment. This interaction is problem-
tic for such position since it was not expected if these magnitude
imensions are fully independent.
Our data are also problematic for proposals suggesting that a
ully shared accumulator mechanism underpins time and number
rocessing (e.g. Meck & Church, 1983). First, we have shown that
umber processing (as well as space) was normal in patient CB,
espite his severe impairment in time processing. This is difﬁcult to
ccount for because a fully shared mechanism would have resulted
lso in an impairment in number processing.
We suggest that our data are best explained by assuming that
ime, numbers and space only partly share a common system. Two
spects of these results are critical. First, they allow us to clarifylogia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
to what extent different magnitude dimensions are independent.
In particular, CBs’ selectively impaired time processing showed
that this is distinct from numbers and space. An ideal experimen-
tal design would combine time, numbers and space in a single
experiment in order to test systematic co-variations in magnitude
judgments across these domains. Although we could not run such
experiment on patient CB, our results nevertheless suggest that
time, numbers and space are partly independent as they can be
selectively impaired and yet they can modulate each other as shown
by their interactions.
Second, our data allow us to suggest what is in common between
different magnitude dimensions. Two possibilities exist: one is that
these dimensions are represented by a shared magnitude system.
However, this system is unlikely to be based on an accumulator
principle such as proposed by previous authors (e.g. Meck & Church,
1983). This is because an accumulator principle cannot account
for processing space as this dimension is not represented through
events or objects to be accumulated in the same way as numbers
and time do. The other possibility, which differs from the ATOM
(Walsh, 2003), is that different magnitude dimensions share the
same operational mechanisms, for instance those used to perform
comparisons. Common operational mechanisms have been previ-
ously hypothesized to account for infants’ different performance
with numerosities and continuous magnitudes (Huntley-Fenner,
Carey, & Solimando, 2002; McCrink & Wynn, 2004). Some studies
have shown that infants react to changes in numerosity (McCrink &
Wynn, 2004) but not to changes in continuous magnitude (Huntley-
Fenner et al., 2002). This result has been explained in terms of
a shared comparison mechanism that operates on different mag-
nitude dimensions rather than in terms of a shared magnitude
system. Moreover, the idea that magnitude dimensions may be
sharing the same operational mechanisms, for instance compar-
ison mechanisms, found some support in studies investigating
whether processing numbers and other magnitude dimensions
activate same or different responses (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007).
For instance, it has been shown that numbers and physical size
are processed separately until response-related stages as indicated
by an interaction of these dimensions in the primary motor cortex
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007). At a speculative level it can be suggested
that shared mechanisms may be more compatible with the nature
of different magnitude dimensions rather than a shared represen-
tational format. Our data on space and number interaction would
be consistent with the hypothesis of shared (comparison) mecha-
nisms although they do not allow us to further speculate on these
two options.
5.4. Time, numbers and space in the brain
What are the anatomical bases of time, number and space
processing? It has been proposed that the locus of the common
magnitude system is the right inferior parietal cortex (e.g. Walsh,
2003). Indeed this area, among others, is often damaged in patients
with impaired time perception (Harrington et al., 2004; Koch et
al., 2003; Meck, 2005). It has also been reported in several imag-
ing studies (e.g. Lejeune et al., 1997; Maquet et al., 1996; Rao et
al., 2001), although time impairments also arise from lesions in the
cerebellum (for the milliseconds range, e.g. Ivry & Spencer, 2004)
and in the basal ganglia (for seconds range, e.g. Matelli & Meck,
2000, 2004; Meck & Benson, 2002). Moreover, the right inferior
parietal lobe, together with its homologous on the left hemisphere,
has been identiﬁed as a key brain region for processing numbers
(e.g. Dehaene et al., 2003) and numerical impairments often fol-
low left hemisphere damages (e.g. Cipolotti et al., 1991; Cipolotti &
van Harskamp, 2001; Dehaene & Cohen, 1997; Lemer et al., 2003).
Finally, it has been shown that space processes involve the parietal
areas and indeed impairments to these processes such as neglect
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o either physical or numerical space are often due to lesions in
he right parietal lobe (e.g. Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001; Doricchi et
l., 20055; Zorzi et al., 2002), although dissociations within spa-
ial processing have also been reported, for instance between near
nd far space (e.g. Cowey, Small, & Ellis, 1994; Halligan & Marshall,
991). Patient CBs’ brain lesion involved the right parietal lobes as
ell as several other regions in the right hemisphere. Therefore, our
natomical data do not allow us to draw any ﬁrm conclusion regard-
ng the involvement of the parietal areas in time, numbers and space
rocessing. We note, however, that despite this lesion number and
pace processing were still well preserved in CB. This is difﬁcult
o accommodate within the proposal of the ATOM that the com-
on magnitude system would be located in the right parietal lobe
Walsh, 2003). Rather, our data allow us to make two suggestions.
irst, it is possible that besides the parietal areas, other brain regions
re involved in processing the speciﬁc magnitude codes. This would
xplain why some of these codes are impaired and others are intact,
n our case time relative to numbers and space. Support to this
ypothesis comes from other studies showing that some parietal
egions, and speciﬁcally the IPS, are only critical for numerical but
ot time processing (Dormal et al., 2008). This would be consis-
ent with CBs’ brain lesion that spared the IPS areas. Secondly, it is
ossible that the neuronal correlates of different magnitude codes
ay recover in different ways following a brain lesion, revealing
lternative neuronal and cognitive mechanisms for performing the
asks, i.e. degenerate systems (Price & Friston, 2002), or that the
erilesioned areas are still sufﬁcient for processing some of these
5 Note that Doricchi et al. (2005, 2009) have suggested that the right prefrontal
reas are those more frequently associated with impairments to the ability to pro-
ess numbers along a line. However, this does not mean that lesions to the parietal
reas cannot cause such impairments. Rather, it means that these lesions are less
requently associated with number line impairments.logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748 2745
dimensions but not others (e.g. Price & Friston, 2002). Although
our data do not allow us to further speculate on this point, we
note that degeneracy and recovery may account for inconsisten-
cies between our results of a dissociation in performing different
magnitude codes and other studies suggesting that the same pari-
etal regions are equally activated when performing temporal and
numerical tasks (e.g. Maquet et al., 1996; Pouthas et al., 2000).
In conclusion, the present study provides the ﬁrst evidence that
time processing can be selectively impaired while number and
space processing is spared. Moreover, we showed that despite this
impairment time processing was still modulated by number quan-
tity. Our data are best accounted for by the hypothesis of a partly
shared magnitude system or operational mechanisms between
these dimensions. Although the right parietal regions appeared
involved in time, numbers and space processing, there is clearly
need to clarify their role in magnitude processing.
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Appendix A. Patient CBs brain scan in the axial view
relation to a template (bottom right)
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ppendix B. Patient CBs brain scan in the horizontal view
elation to a template (bottom right)
ppendix C. Schematic representation of the design of the
xperimental tasks used
Tasks 1 and 2: Time and numerosity estimation with non-
umerical stimuli in a concurrent task (naming circles’ colour).
Tasks 3 and 4: Time and numerosity estimation with numerical
timuli in a concurrent task (reading numbers aloud).logia 47 (2009) 2732–2748
Task 5: Time discrimination with no concurrent task.
Task 6: Line length discrimination.
Task 7: Parity judgment.
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Task 8: Number comparison.
ppendix D. Point of subjective equality (PSE) in control
ubjects in time discrimination task (Task 5)
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